-w path-to-file -p permissions -k keyname
where the permission are any one of the following:
Watches can also be created using the syscall format described below which allow for greater flexibility and options. Using syscall rules you can choose between path and dir which is against a specific inode or directory tree respectively. It should also be noted that the recursive directory watch will stop if there is a mount point below the parent directory. There is an option to make the mounted subdirectory equivalent by using a -q rule.
The Linux kernel has 4 rule matching lists or filters as they are sometimes called. They are: task, exit, user, and exclude. The task list is checked only during the fork or clone syscalls. It is rarely used in practice.
The exit filter is the place where all syscall and file system audit requests are evaluated.
The user filter is used to filter (remove) some events that originate in user space. By default, any event originating in user space is allowed. So, if there are some events that you do not want to see, then this is a place where some can be removed. See auditctl(8) for fields that are valid.
The exclude filter is used to exclude certain events from being emitted. The msgtype and a number of subject attribute fields can be used to tell the kernel which message types you do not want to record. This filter can remove the event as a whole and is not selective about any other attribute. The user and exit filters are better suited to selectively auditing events. The action is ignored for this filter, defaulting to "never".
Syscall rules take the general form of:
-a action,list -S syscall -F field=value -k keyname
The -a option tells the kernel's rule matching engine that we want to append a rule at the end of the rule list. But we need to specify which rule list it goes on and what action to take when it triggers. Valid actions are:
The action and list are separated by a comma but no space in between. Valid lists are: task, exit, user, and exclude. Their meaning was explained earlier.
Next in the rule would normally be the -S option. This field can either be the syscall name or number. For readability, the name is almost always used. You may give more than one syscall in a rule by specifying another -S option. When sent into the kernel, all syscall fields are put into a mask so that one compare can determine if the syscall is of interest. So, adding multiple syscalls in one rule is very efficient. When you specify a syscall name, auditctl will look up the name and get its syscall number. This leads to some problems on bi-arch machines. The 32 and 64 bit syscall numbers sometimes, but not always, line up. So, to solve this problem, you would generally need to break the rule into 2 with one specifying -F arch=b32 and the other specifying -F arch=b64. This needs to go in front of the -S option so that auditctl looks at the right lookup table when returning the number.
After the syscall is specified, you would normally have one or more -F options that fine tune what to match against. Rather than list all the valid field types here, the reader should look at the auditctl man page which has a full listing of each field and what it means. But it's worth mentioning a couple things.
The audit system considers uids to be unsigned numbers. The audit system uses the number -1 to indicate that a loginuid is not set. This means that when it's printed out, it looks like 4294967295. If you write a rule that you wanted try to get the valid users of the system, you need to look in /etc/login.defs to see where user accounts start. For example, if UID_MIN is 500, then you would also need to take into account that the unsigned representation of -1 is higher than 500. So you would address this with the following piece of a rule:
-F auid>=500 -F auid!=4294967295
These individual checks are "anded" and both have to be true.
The last thing to know about syscall rules is that you can add a key field which is a free form text string that you want inserted into the event to help identify its meaning. This is discussed in more detail in the NOTES section.
When doing an investigation, you would normally start off with the main aureport output to just get an idea about what is happening on the system. This report mostly tells you about events that are hard coded by the audit system such as login/out, uses of authentication, system anomalies, how many users have been on the machine, and if SE Linux has detected any AVCs.
aureport --start this-week
After looking at the report, you probably want to get a second view about what rules you loaded that have been triggering. This is where keys become important. You would generally run the key summary report like this:
aureport --start this-week --key --summary
This will give an ordered listing of the keys associated with rules that have been triggering. If, for example, you had a syscall audit rule that triggered on the failure to open files with EPERM that had a key field of access like this:
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -S openat -F exit=-EPERM -k access
Then you can isolate these failures with ausearch and pipe the results to aureport for display. Suppose your investigation noticed a lot of the access denied events. If you wanted to see the files that unauthorized access has been attempted, you could run the following command:
ausearch --start this-week -k access --raw | aureport --file --summary
This will give an ordered list showing which files are being accessed with the EPERM failure. Suppose you wanted to see which users might be having failed access, you would run the following command:
ausearch --start this-week -k access --raw | aureport --user --summary
If your investigation showed a lot of failed accesses to a particular file, you could run the following report to see who is doing it:
ausearch --start this-week -k access -f /path-to/file --raw | aureport --user -i
This report will give you the individual access attempts by person. If you needed to see the actual audit event that is being reported, you would look at the date, time, and event columns. Assuming the event was 822 and it occurred at 2:30 on 09/01/2009 and you use the en_US.utf8 locale, the command would look something like this:
ausearch --start 09/01/2009 02:30 -a 822 -i --just-one
This will select the first event from that day and time with the matching event id and interpret the numeric values into human readable values.
The most important step in being able to do this kind of analysis is setting up key fields when the rules were originally written. It should also be pointed out that you can have more than one key field associated with any given rule.
If you get a warning from auditctl saying, "32/64 bit syscall mismatch in line XX, you should specify an arch". This means that you specified a syscall rule on a bi-arch system where the syscall has a different syscall number for the 32 and 64 bit interfaces. This means that on one of those interfaces you are likely auditing the wrong syscall. To solve the problem, re-write the rule as two rules specifying the intended arch for each rule. For example,
-always,exit -S openat -k access
would be rewritten as
-always,exit -F arch=b32 -S openat -k access -always,exit -F arch=b64 -S openat -k access
If you get a warning that says, "entry rules deprecated, changing to exit rule". This means that you have a rule intended for the entry filter, but that filter is no longer available. Auditctl moved your rule to the exit filter so that it's not lost. But to solve this so that you do not get the warning any more, you need to change the offending rule from entry to exit.
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -S openat -F exit=-EACCES -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S open -S openat -F exit=-EPERM -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -S openat -F exit=-EACCES -k access -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S open -S openat -F exit=-EPERM -k access
-a always,exclude -F msgtype=CRED_REFR